Coordinating Machine Politics and Clientelism: Variation in Non-Programmatic Electoral Strategies
Bidragets beskrivning
Incumbents in authoritarian regimes and new democracies can use a variety of non-programmatic electoral strategies, such as electoral fraud and electoral clientelism, to skew the ‘electoral playing field' in their favour. However, these electoral strategies are by no means cost-free or necessarily that efficient, and require complex delegation and coordination at several levels of the electoral ‘machine'. This project is part of emerging comparative literature that investigates how various contextual conditions within countries mitigate the delegation problems associated with the coordination of electoral malfeasance and electoral clientelism. These substantively and normatively important questions are investigated with original qualitative and quantitative data, as well as experimental methods. The project has great potential for making important contributions to the comparative literature on democratization and authoritarian politics.
Visa merStartår
2018
Slutår
2024
Beviljade finansiering
Andra beslut
353296
Akademiforskarens forskningskostnader(2022)
12 663 €
319883
Akademiforskarens forskningskostnader(2018)
39 025 €
Finansiär
Finlands Akademi
Typ av finansiering
Akademiforskare
Utlysning
Övriga uppgifter
Finansieringsbeslutets nummer
316897
Vetenskapsområden
Statsvetenskap
Forskningsområden
Valtiotieteet
Identifierade teman
politics, democracy