Coordinating Machine Politics and Clientelism: Variation in Non-Programmatic Electoral Strategies

Bidragets beskrivning

Incumbents in authoritarian regimes and new democracies can use a variety of non-programmatic electoral strategies, such as electoral fraud and electoral clientelism, to skew the ‘electoral playing field' in their favour. However, these electoral strategies are by no means cost-free or necessarily that efficient, and require complex delegation and coordination at several levels of the electoral ‘machine'. This project is part of emerging comparative literature that investigates how various contextual conditions within countries mitigate the delegation problems associated with the coordination of electoral malfeasance and electoral clientelism. These substantively and normatively important questions are investigated with original qualitative and quantitative data, as well as experimental methods. The project has great potential for making important contributions to the comparative literature on democratization and authoritarian politics.
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Startår

2018

Slutår

2024

Beviljade finansiering

Inga Saikkonen Orcid -palvelun logo
438 870 €

Andra beslut

353296
Akademiforskarens forskningskostnader(2022)
12 663 €
319883
Akademiforskarens forskningskostnader(2018)
39 025 €

Finansiär

Finlands Akademi

Typ av finansiering

Akademiforskare

Övriga uppgifter

Finansieringsbeslutets nummer

316897

Vetenskapsområden

Statsvetenskap

Forskningsområden

Valtiotieteet

Identifierade teman

politics, democracy